In constrained school choice mechanisms, students can only rank a subset of the schools they could potentially access. We characterize dominant and undominated strategies in the constrained Boston (BOS) and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms. Using our characterization of dominant strategies we show that in constrained DA, the single tie-breaking rule outperforms the multiple tie-breaking rule in terms of both manipulability and stability. We also show that DA is less manipulable than constrained BOS in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015) . Using our characterizations of undominated strategies, we derive advice for the students and show that more strategies can be excluded on the basis of dominance in constrained DA than in constrained BOS.
Introduction
In the problem of assigning students to schools, the deferred-acceptance mechanism (DA) is non-manipulable and stable whereas the Boston mechanism (BOS) satisfies none of the two properties (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) .
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These classical results are often used to argue in favor of DA and against BOS.
One limitation of these results is they require that students be able to report a ranking of all the schools they could potentially access. In practice however, most school districts use constrained mechanisms (Haeringer and Klijn, 2009) in which students are only allowed to rank a limited number of schools.
2 We denote the constrained version of the two above mechanisms by DA k and BOS k , where k is the number of schools students can report.
Unfortunately, when it is constrained, DA looses both of its appealing properties. First, DA k is manipulable because students have to worry about running out of reported schools if they rank schools at which they have a low priority. Second, DA k is unstable when students cannot rank all the schools because they may fail to claim a seat at some schools that they like better than their assignment. Hence, the comparison of DA k and BOS k is much less clear than that of DA and BOS.
In this paper, we characterize the undominated and dominant strategies of the games induced by DA k and BOS k . We use these characterizations to show that the comparison between DA and BOS extends to DA k and BOS k in the sense that DA k has better stability and manipulability properties than BOS k . First, we demonstrate that the proportion of students who have a dominant strategy in DA k increases with k. This result is not the mere consequence of more students being able to rank all their acceptable schools as k increases. Instead, it relates to possible correlations between priorities at schools and to the concept of a safe set of school that we introduce. We also show that students who have a dominant strategy in DA k do not cause instabilities.
3 These two results suggest that stability and non-manipulability improve in DA k as k increases. The same is not true for BOS k where dominant strategies are not affected by k or by correlation in the priorities. In fact, given any profile of priorities, every preference relation that provides a student with a truthful dominant strategy in BOS k also provides the student with a truthful dominant strategy in DA k (but the converse is not true). Thus DA k is less manipulable than BOS k in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015) . Using the same criterion, we show that contrary to BOS k which is equally manipulable for all k, DA k becomes less manipulable as k increases.
Using our characterization of undominated strategies, we derive recommendations on the way student should report their preferences in DA k and BOS k . Because these recommendations are based on dominance only, they are uncontroversial in the sense that they do not depend on the preferences reported by the other students.
Roughly, we show that in DA k students should report as many acceptable schools as possible without switches (i.e., in the same order as their true preferences). But students should also pay careful attention to the priority structure. Indeed, not all strategies that report as many acceptable schools as possible without switch are undominated. Students must take advantage of safe sets of schools and select the right combination of schools to report for their strategy to be undominated.
In BOS k , it is much harder to give uncontroversial recommendations to students. In fact, we show that the set of strategies that can be ruled out on the basis of dominance in BOS k is a subset of the set of strategies that can be ruled out on the same basis in DA k . In this sense too, BOS k is strategically more involved than DA k . Another limitation of the standard theory of school choice is the assumption that schools rank students according to a strict priority order. In practice, the criteria used to establish priorities are often too sparse to establish such a strict ranking. To apply standard assignment mechanisms, school district therefore rely on random tie-breaking rules.
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The two most common tie-breaking rules are the single tie-breaking rule (STB) and the multiple tie-breaking rule (MTB). STB breaks ties in the same way in every school whereas MTB draws a different tie-breaking order at each school.
Counter-factual simulations based on field data as well as theoretical results in large random environments suggest that DA is more efficient when used with STB than with MTB.
5 In contrast with the existing literature, we introduce the first results on the stability and manipulability effects of tie-breaking rules. Intuitively, STB induces more correlation than MTB among priorities at different schools (on average). Thus, by the results described above, STB makes it more likely for students (i) to have a dominant strategy and (ii) not to cause instabilities. We confirm this intuition in a simulation using random profiles. Our simulation shows a clear increase in the proportion of students who have a dominant strategy as k increase when STB is used. The same proportion is almost flat when MTB is used.
The school choice model
The model is similar to Haeringer and Klijn (2009) . 6 There is a finite set of schools S := {s 1 , . . . , s m } with m ≥ 2, and a finite set of students T := {t 1 , . . . , t n }.
A generic school is denoted s j or sometimes s. Every school s j ∈ S has a capacity q j and a priority profile F j . A capacity q j ∈ N + represents the number of seats available at school s j . Priorities F j are linear orderings on the students in T . We assume that the seats are in short-supply, that is sj ∈S q j < n.
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A generic student is denoted t i , or sometimes t. Every student t i has preferences R i . Preferences are a linear ordering on S ∪ {t i }. A preference profile R := (R 1 , . . . , R n ) is a list of the preferences of every t i ∈ T . For a given preference profile R, the list containing the preferences of everyone but t i is R −i .
Profiles of preferences, priorities, and quotas are fixed but arbitrary throughout most of the paper. Exceptions are the simulation in Section 5.2 and the 4 In Boston for example, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2006) report that the high-school district can have more than 6000 applicants for only 5 priority groups. Thus, numerous ties ensue and tie-breaking plays an essential role in students' eventual assignment.
5 See Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009) and De Haan et al. (2015) for simulations based on field data, and , and Arnosti (2015) for theoretical results in the large.
6 The model in this paper differs slightly from the model of the companion paper Decerf and Van der Linden (2016) . Among other differences, here we take advantage of the fact that priorities, quotas and preferences can be fixed throughout most of the analysis to simplify the model.
7 This is a minor restriction which is common in the literature (see Decerf and Van der Linden (2016) for a detailed justification). We adopt the assumption throughout for simplicity. Most of our results on DA hold without the short-supply assumption. It is very useful in BOS k however because it significantly restricts the set of undominated strategies (see Section 6). Even then, it is often enough to assume that no set of k schools has more seats than the number of students. manipulability analysis of Section 7 in which we compare different (sets of) profiles.
A strict preference of t i for s over s is denoted s P i s , while s R i s denotes a weak preference, allowing for s = s . A school s ∈ S is acceptable for t i if s R i t i . For simplicity, we abuse the notation and write s ∈ R i when s is acceptable according to R and #R i for the number of acceptable schools in R i . By the same token, a subset of schools S ⊆ S is acceptable for t i if all the schools in S are acceptable, which we denote S ⊆ R i . For all x, school R i (x) is the school ranked in x-th position in R i .
An assignment is a function µ : T → S ∪T that distributes the seats among students. In an assignment, every student is assigned to a school or to herself (µ(t) ∈ S ∪ {t}). An assignment is feasible if no school exceeds its capacity, i.e., for all s j ∈ S, #{t ∈ T | µ(t) = s j } ≤ q j , where for any set A, #A denotes the cardinality of A.
A student-school pair (t, s j ) is blocking in assignment µ if t prefers s j to µ(t) and there exists t with µ(t ) = s j and t F j t . An assignment µ is stable if it satisfies (No unjustified envy) µ contains no blocking pairs, (Individual rationality) no student t i is assigned to an unacceptable school, and (Non wastefulness) no student prefers a school with an available seat to her assignment, that is there exists no t i ∈ T and s j ∈ S such that s j P i µ(t i ) and there are less than q j students assigned to s j in µ.
A student t i causes an instability in assignment µ if she is involved in a violation of one of the three above properties, i.e., t i is either (i) involved in a blocking pair, (ii) assigned to an unacceptable school, or (iii) prefers a school with an available seat to her assignment.
School choice mechanisms and games of school choice
A (school choice) mechanism M associates every profile of reported preferences Q := (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) in some domain with a feasible assignment µ. In a constrained mechanism M k , the domain only contains reported preference profiles in which students report no more than k ≤ m acceptable schools. The notation and terminology for preferences extend to reported preferences : (i) s Q i s means that t i reports s weakly before s in Q i (where possibly s = s ),
is the school ranked in x-th position in Q i , (vii) a typical profile of reported preferences is Q := (Q 1 , . . . , Q n ) and (viii) Q −i is the list of reported preferences of every student but t i .
For any Q and any t i , the school t i is assigned to under assignment
A pair (M, R) defines a strategic form game known as a game of school choice (Ergin and Sönmez, 2006) . Therefore, we sometimes refer to reported preferences Q i as strategies. Given mechanism M , Q i is a dominant strategy
Strategy Q i is dominated if it is not undominated, that is there exists a strat-
Two classes of competing mechanisms
In this section we describe the two classes of school choice mechanisms that we focus on. These classes were identified by Haeringer and Klijn (2009) and correspond to constrained versions of BOS and DA. We first describe the well known unconstrained BOS.
Round 1: Students apply to the school they reported as their most preferred acceptable school (if any). Every school that receives more applications than its capacity starts rejecting the lowest applicants in its priority ranking, up to the point where it meets its capacity. All other applicants are definitively accepted at the schools they applied to and capacities are adjusted accordingly.
. . .
Round : Students who
are not yet assigned apply to the school they reported as their th acceptable school (if any). Every school that receives more new applications in round than its remaining capacity starts rejecting the lowest new applicants in its priority ranking, up to the point where it meets its capacity. All other applicants are definitively accepted at the schools they applied to and capacities are adjusted accordingly.
The algorithm terminates when all acceptable schools of the reported profile have been considered, or when every student is assigned to a school. The constrained versions of BOS which we will denote by BOS k are identical to BOS except that no student is allowed more than k acceptable schools in her reported preferences.
We now turn to DA. Again, we first describe the famous unconstrained DA.
Round 1: Students apply to the school they reported as their most preferred acceptable school (if any). Every school that receives more applications than its capacity definitively rejects the lowest applicants in its priority ranking, up to the point where it meets its capacity. All other applicants are temporarily accepted at the schools they applied to (this means they could still be rejected in a later round).
Round :
Students who were rejected in round − 1 apply to their next acceptable school (if any). Every school considers the new applicants of round together with the students it temporarily accepted. If needed, each school definitely rejects the lowest students in its priority ranking, up to the point where it meets its capacity. All other applicants are temporarily accepted at the schools they applied to (this means they could still be rejected in a later round).
The algorithm terminates when all acceptable schools of the reported profile have been considered, or when every student is assigned to a school. The constrained versions of DA which we will denote DA k are identical to DA except that no student is allowed more than k acceptable schools in her reported preferences.
Safe sets, safe strategies and other concepts
In this section, we introduce some concepts that will prove useful in the characterization of undominated and dominant strategies in DA k and BOS k . Of particular importance are the concepts of safe sets and safe strategies which we illustrate in more details.
In many games, the set of undominated strategies is quite large. In some games, it is even equal to the whole strategy space. In school choice mechanisms however, requiring that a strategy be undominated is far from vacuous. In DA k mechanisms in particular, eliminating dominated strategies constrains the set of strategies significantly. Lemma 1 in Section 5.1 shows that most undominated strategies (i) do not rank unacceptable schools, (ii) feature no switches, where a switch is a situation in which schools s and s are ranked in Q i and s Q i s although s P i s, and (iii) rank as many acceptable schools as possible, i.e., #Q i = min{k, #R i }.
When a strategy satisfies (i), (ii) and (iii) we say that this strategy is clean.
As we show in Example 1 below, although most undominated strategies are clean, not all clean strategies are undominated. The example relies on the concept of a safe set (of schools). A set of schools S S ⊆ S is safe for t i if whenever t i ranks all the schools in S S , t i is at least assigned to the worst school in S S according to t i 's reported preferences. Formally, take any set of schools S * ⊆ S. Let Q * i be any strategy that ranks all the schools in S * and let s * ∈ S * be the last school in S * that is ranked in
Example 1 (Safe set of schools). For simplicity, the example is presented for DA 3 in an environment with 4 schools but it can easily be extended to more schools. The left panel represents the students' preferences and the right panel represents the schools' priorities. Each school has one seat and the notation ( ) indicates that the rest of the ordering is arbitrary.
At first glance, it may seem that for t 4 , ranking Q 4 : s 1 s 2 s 4 is undominated. By ranking s 4 where t 4 has the highest priority, t 4 makes sure that if t 1 and t 2 obtain the unique seats at s 1 and s 2 , t 4 would not end up unassigned. But note that if t 1 and t 2 are assigned to s 1 and s 2 , t 2 cannot at the same time be assigned to s 3 . If t 2 is assigned to either s 1 or s 2 , then student t 4 has the highest priority at t 3 among the remaining students. Thus, for t 4 , reporting Q 4 : s 1 s 2 s 3 dominates reporting Q 4 : s 1 s 2 s 4 .
In the above terminology, {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } is a safe set for t 4 because when ranking s 1 , s 2 , and s 3 , student t 4 is certain to be assigned to a school she reports (weakly) above the school she reports last in {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } (whatever other students report).
A safe strategy is a strategy that contains a safe set. Among other things, a student who plays a safe strategy is guaranteed to be assigned.
We say that school s j is safe-if-favorite for t i if t i is among the q j -students with highest priority at school s j . The terminology refers to BOS k . If school s j is safe-if-favorite for t i and
Example 1 (Continued). School s 3 is safe-if-favorite for t 2 because t 2 has the highest priority at s 3 . For any Q 2 : s 3 ( ), we have BOS k 2 (Q 2 , Q −2 ) = s 3 for all Q −2 . For the same reason, both schools s 1 and s 2 are safe-if-favorite for t 1 .
Finally, for any mechanism M and strategy Q i , the range of Q i is the set of all the schools t i could be assigned to when she reports Q i ; that is,
Example 1 (Continued). Consider Q 2 : s 1 s 3 s 2 . Note that s 3 is safe-if-favorite for t 2 . Thus, t 2 is never assigned to s 2 or t 2 when reporting Q 2 in DA 3 . Also, there exists Q −2 for which DA 3 2 (Q 2 , Q −2 ) = s 1 , for example when t 1 does not rank s 1 . Therefore, Range(Q 2 ) = {s 1 , s 3 } in DA 3 .
5 Dominant and undominated strategies in DA k
Preliminary results
In this subsection, we present some preliminary results that shed light on the structure of dominant and undominated strategies in DA k . These results are used to prove the characterizations of dominant and undominated strategies in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
We know from Example 1 that undominated strategies are not as simple as they may seem in DA k . Strictly speaking, it is not even the case that all undominated strategies are clean (see Section 7). For example, when a student has the highest priority at her most preferred school, any strategy in which she ranks her favorite school first is undominated. This includes many unclean undominated strategies. In these unclean undominated strategies however, the student is always assigned to her first choice and any violation of (i), (ii) or (iii) (in the definition of a clean strategy) never has any impact on the student's assignment.
Lemma 3 at the end of this section shows that this is true for any unclean undominated strategy. If an undominated strategy violates (i), (ii), or (iii), it must contain a safe set past which the student can inconsequentially rank unacceptable schools, rank schools with switch, or not rank any additional schools.
Lemma 3 relies on the two next lemmas which will also be useful in the characterizations and are interesting in their own right. Two strategies Q i and Q i are equivalent if the outcome for t i is the same under Q i and Q i for all Q −i . Lemma 1 shows that for every unclean undominated strategy there exists an equivalent clean strategy. Lemma 1 is useful when studying the properties of undominated strategies outcomes in DA k because it allows us to focus on clean profiles only (i.e., profiles made of clean strategies).
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Lemma 1. For all k ∈ N and any undominated strategy Q i of DA k , there exists an equivalent strategy Q i of DA k that is clean.
Lemma 1 follows from the strategy-proofness of DA (Dubins and Freedman, 1981) . Let Q i be any clean strategy of DA k which reports first all acceptable schools ranked in Q i . By strategy-proofness, if Q i were t i 's true preferences, 9 t i would always (weakly) prefer ranking Q i to ranking Q i . But by construction of Q i , this implies that t i also likes the outcome of Q i weakly better than the outcome of Q i with respect to t i 's true preferences R i . Because Q i is undominated, the only way this can be true is if Q i and Q i always yield the same outcome.
Intuitively, Lemma 2 shows that, in DA k , a student will regret "wasting" ranked schools unless she is absolutely sure that this "waste" will never have any impact on her assignment. For instance, consider the unsafe strategy
4 for some unacceptable school s. Lemma 2 implies that t i will regret not having ranked R i (2) for some subprofile Q * −i . By this we mean that when others report Q * −i and t i reports Q i , t i will end up assigned to R i (3) and could have been assigned to R i (2) if she had reported
Lemma 2 also implies that when t i reports the unsafe Q i , she will regret not having ranked an acceptable school instead of s for some subprofiles Q * * −i (assuming t i has at least four acceptable schools). The lemma is based on the concept of an accessible school. A school s * is accessible for t i given Q −i if t i is certain to be assigned to a school she ranks at least as high as s * when ranking s * . Formally, school s * is accessible for
Lemma 2 shows that if t i is assigned toŝ under some profile Q, then any school s * that Q i ranks lower thanŝ or that is not ranked under Q i is accessible under some other subprofile Q * −i for which t i is still assigned toŝ when reporting Q i .
Lemma 2 (Regret if waste ranked school).
8 Indeed, by Lemma 1, if all outcomes of clean undominated strategies in DA k satisfy property X, then all undominated strategy outcomes in DA k satisfy property X.
9 By which we mean that t i 's preferences would take the form R i :
The construction of Q * −i in Lemma 2 is relatively simple. Because DA k i
(Q i , Q −i ) =ŝ, we know that t i has been rejected from all the schools that Q i ranks aboveŝ. This means that, in the list of assignments DA k (Q i , Q −i ), there is a student with a higher priority than t i assigned to every seat at each of these schools. But then any profile Q * −i in which these students rank only the school they are assigned to in DA k (Q i , Q −i ) and in which other students rank neither s nor s * satisfies the conditions in the lemma. The next lemma follows from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. For all k ∈ N, if Q i is an unclean undominated strategy in DA k , then there exists a safe set S S ranked in Q i such that (i) any schools that are switched in Q i are ranked after S S , and
(ii) any unacceptable school is ranked after S S .
When Q i is an unclean undominated strategy, we know from Lemma 1 that we can construct an equivalent clean strategy Q i . Strategy Q i is constructed from Q i by (a) switch alternatives in Q i , (b) deleting unacceptable schools, and (c) adding unranked acceptable schools. Because Q i and Q i are equivalent, (a), (b) and (c) can never have any impact on t i 's assignment. The only way this can be true is if there exists a safe set and if that safe set satisfies (i) and (ii). 
Characterizing dominant strategies
Equipped with the lemmas from the last subsection, we can now characterize the set of dominant strategies in DA k .
Proposition 1 (Dominant strategies in DA k ). For all k ∈ N, strategy Q i is dominant in DA k if and only if either (i) all the acceptable schools in R i are ranked without switches in Q i and these are the only schools ranked in Q i , i.e., Q i :
(ii) for some q ≤ min{k, #R i }, the q most preferred schools in R i form a safe set that is ranked first in Q i and there is no switch among those q schools in Q i , i.e., Q i :
The sufficiency of (i) and (ii) follows directly from the strategy-proofness of DA (Dubins and Freedman, 1981) . By Lemma 3, it is sufficient to prove the necessity of (i) and (ii) for dominant strategies with no switches and no unacceptable schools. For such a dominant strategy to violate both (i) and (ii), the strategy must fail to rank some acceptable schoolŝ. This means that t i will 10 Lemma 2 is used to guarantee this last point. If there is no safe set satisfying (i) and (ii), Lemma 2 can be used to show that for some Q * −i , a school ranked before school
, contradicting the fact that Q i and Q i are equivalent. sometimes be unassigned, or assigned to a school s * that t i likes less thanŝ. But in both these cases, Lemma 2 tells us that for some sub-profile Q * −i , t i could have been assigned toŝ if t i had reported different preferences, which makes it impossible for Q i to be a dominant strategy.
5.2.1 More dominant strategies as k increases and under the single tie-breaking rule : evidence from simulations Proposition 1 notably implies that the proportion of agents who have a dominant strategy increases with k (for a given profile of preferences, priorities, and capacities). First, as k increases, more and more students can rank all their acceptable schools (condition (i)). Martin: We already use q for capacities, we should use a different letter here
But more importantly, the number of students who have a safe set covering their q ≤ k preferred schools weakly increases with k (condition (ii)). Indeed, a set of schools S is safe for t i if the set of students who have a higher priority than t i at any of the schools in S contains less students that the total number of seats at schools in S.
Oftentimes, this number is in fact strictly increasing, in particular if priorities are correlated across schools. Such correlations can occur when priorities are determined by test scores. Correlations can also result from the tie-breaking rule in use. In many school districts, the criteria used to determine students' priorities are not sufficient to generate a strict priority ranking of the students. To apply DA k , ties in priorities are therefore broken, usually at random. The two most common tie-breaking rules are the single tie-breaking rule (STB) and the multiple tie-breaking rule (MTB). STB breaks ties in the same way at every school whereas MTB uses a different random order to break ties at each school.
The literature suggests that STB performs better than MTB in terms of efficiency (see the references in Footnote 5). Condition (ii) in Proposition 1 indicates that STB also induces better incentives than MTB as measured by the proportion of students with a dominant strategy. We illustrate this last point through simulations in Figure 1 . In the figure, the proportion of students with a dominant strategy is always higher under STB than under MTB.
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The next corollary of Proposition 1 shows that correlations in priorities also have implications for stability.
Corollary 1 follows from observing that in both (i) and (ii) in Proposition 1, t i applies and is rejected from every school she likes better than her assignment.
When combined with Proposition 1, Corollary 1 implies that the lines in Figure 1 provide an upper bound on the number of students who could cause instabilities. The upper bound corresponds to one minus the proportions in the figures and relies on the assumption that students play dominant strategies 11 The linearity of the curves is a consequence of averaging across different random profiles. Monotonicity in k on the other hand is a feature of every individual profile as Proposition 1 shows.
when such strategies are available. The simulation therefore suggests that STB could also induce more stable assignments than MTB. as a function of the number of schools that students can rank. The value for each k is the average over 100 random profiles of preferences, priorities, and capacities, with 1000 students and 10 schools. In every profile, all 10 schools are acceptable to every student. The four lines correspond to different values of the sum of seats at the 10 schools (the 1000 case is in slight violation of the short-supply assumption). Priorities are constructed by forming 4 random priority groups at each school. Ties inside the groups are then broken according to the multiple tie-breaking rule (subfigure (a)) or the single tie-breaking rule (subfigure (b)).
Characterizing undominated strategies
We now turn to the characterization of undominated strategies. Clearly, if t i has dominant strategies, then these dominant strategies are t i 's only undominated strategies. It remains to determine the form of undominated strategies when t i does not have a dominant strategy. The next lemma shows that in this case, t i must rank k (acceptable) schools for a strategy to be undominated.
The intuition is similar to the previous lemmas. If neither case (i) nor case (ii) in Proposition 1 apply and if #Q i < k, then t i does not rank one of her acceptable schoolŝ. Also, there is a risk for t i to be unassigned or to be assigned to a school that she likes less thanŝ. Then, by Lemma 2, the strategy that ranks the acceptable schools in Q i as-well asŝ without switches dominates Q i .
By Lemma 4, ranking k acceptable schools is necessary for Q i to be undominated (if Q i is not dominant). But as we illustrated in Example 1, it is not sufficient. In the example, strategy Q 4 : s 1 s 2 s 4 consists of three acceptable schools. It is however dominated in DA 3 for t 4 because {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 } is a safe set for t 4 .
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The problem with Q 4 is that t 4 has a safe set that is in some sense "everywhere above" Q 4 . To make this more precise, let us introduce the concept of a minimal safe set. For a set of schools S * ⊆ S, let w S * be the worst school in S * according to R i . A minimal safe set S M S is a safe set for which S M S \{w S M S } is not a safe set. We then have the following characterization.
Proposition 2 (Undominated strategies in DA k ). For all k ∈ N, Q i is an undominated strategy in DA k if and only if either
(ii) k acceptable schools are ranked without switches in Q i and for any minimal safe set
for some s ∈ Q i with s / ∈ S M S .
Uncontroversial recommendations in DA k
Proposition 2 summarizes all the recommendations that derive from the lemmas of Section 5.1 and from Proposition 1. First, if a student is able to rank all her acceptable schools, doing so is optimal (point (i) and Proposition 1). Second, as in DA, unclean strategies are never optimal. By Proposition 2, the only case in which an undominated strategy is unclean corresponds to (ii) in Proposition 1. Even then, playing an unclean strategy is a risk not worth taking. Whatever strategy a student decides to play, (a) she never looses from playing an equivalent clean strategy instead, and (b) she might gain from it if she wrongly believed that case (ii) in Proposition 1 applies. In this sense, no unclean undominated strategy is robust to a misappreciation of the priority structure.
Third, students should pay close attention to the priority structure in deciding which strategy to adopt. In particular, students might be too conservative if they do not take into account the interaction between their priorities at different schools. Ranking "safety" schools at which a student has a high priorities may seem wise if the student is worried she might end up unassigned. As case (ii) in Proposition 2 shows however, safety strategies may be dominated by strategies that rank an appropriate combination of more risky schools at which the student has slightly lower priorities (see Example 1).
6 Dominant and undominated strategies in BOS k
Preliminary results
Again, we start with some preliminary results about the form of dominant and undominated strategies in BOS k . Contrary to DA k , undominated strategies in BOS k feature non-trivial switches, i.e., switches that do affect students' assignments. This is a consequence of BOS being manipulable (as opposed to DA).
Despite allowing for non-trivial switches, undominated strategy in BOS k share some common properties with the undominated strategies of DA k .
Lemma 5. For all k ∈ N, if strategy Q i is undominated in BOS k , then Range(Q i ) contains only acceptable schools.
13
Although all schools in the range of an undominated strategy Q i are acceptable, not all schools in Q i belong to the range of Q i in BOS k . As in DA k , some strategies of BOS k are safe and contain ranked schools that never affect the final assignment. These safe strategies are much more rare in BOS k than in DA k however, as the next lemma shows. Let an over-supplied set of schools O ⊆ S be a set of school for which sj ∈O q j ≥ n.
Lemma 6 (Safe strategies in BOS k ). For all k ∈ N, a strategy Q i is safe in BOS k if and only if
(ii) there exists an over-supplied set of schools O ⊆ Q i with #O ≤ k.
Note that (ii) is ruled out by the short-supply assumption. Under the shortsupply assumption, BOS k rarely features safe strategies because when Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite, a student can be rejected in the first round while all the schools are filled in the first round. When this occurs, t i ends up unassigned because BOS k does not allow t i to claim the seats of students who were assigned in the first round in later rounds of BOS k . Combined with Lemma 6, Lemma 7 shows that only safe strategies can dominate a strategy that contains min{k, #R i } acceptable schools.
Lemma 7. For all k ∈ N, if Q i ranks min{k, #R i } schools all of which are acceptable and if Q i dominates Q i , then Q i is safe.
Intuitively, when Q i is unsafe and different from Q i , it is always possible to construct a sub-profile Q * −i for which t i is assigned when playing Q i but is unassigned when playing Q i . Then the lemma follows from the fact that Q i only ranks acceptable schools.
Characterizing dominant strategies
As the preliminary results suggest, BOS k rarely features dominant strategies.
Proposition 3 (Dominant strategies in BOS k ). For all k ∈ N, a strategy Q i is a dominant strategy in BOS k if and only if Q i (1) = R i (1) and either
Intuitively, if R i (1) is not safe-if-favorite, it is always possible to find another undominated strategy Q i = Q i containing min{k, #R i } acceptable schools. Then by Lemma 7, Q i does not dominate Q i .
From Proposition 3 it is easy to see that, as in DA k , students who have dominant strategies in BOS k do not cause instabilities.
Corollary 2. For all k ∈ N and any
Observe however that the number of students who have a dominant strategy is typically small and does not increase with k in BOS k (under the short-supply assumption).
14 Thus, the trends illustrated in Figure 1 do not occur in BOS k . In particular, the choice of the tie-breaking rule does not impact the number of students who have a dominant strategy in BOS k . As a consequence, the channel through which stability increases when k increases in DA k does not play out in BOS k either (despite Corollary 2).
Characterizing undominated strategies
Revealing preferences truthfully is a dominant strategy in DA. Advising students to do so is therefore uncontroversial. In this sense, DA has better strategic properties than BOS because truthful report is not a dominant strategy in BOS. A similar result holds for DA k and BOS k . As we show in Corollary 3 (Section 7), it is easier to uncontroversially rule out some strategies in DA k than in BOS k . The next proposition is instrumental in proving Corollary 3. It shows that the set of undominated strategies of BOS k is quite large.
Proposition 4 (Undominated strategies in BOS k ). For all k ∈ N, Q i is an undominated strategy in BOS k if and only if either (i) Q i (1) is t i 's preferred safe-if-favorite and acceptable school, or
(ii) Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite and Q i contains min{k, #R i } acceptable schools, one of which t i prefers to all of her safe-if-favorite and acceptable schools.
Observe that if R i (1) is safe-if-favorite, (ii) cannot occur and the undominated strategies are those dominant strategies Q i for which Q i (1) = R i (1). Observe also that (ii) does not restrict the ordering of schools in Q i to match R i and allows for many non-trivial switches.
To see why (ii) is sufficient recall that, by Lemma 7, when Q i ranks min{k, #R i } acceptable schools, Q i is not dominated by any unsafe strategy. A safe strategy Q i can still dominate Q i . By Lemma 6, such safe strategy Q i must always result in the assignment of t i to her safe-if-favorite school Q i (1). But by (ii), Q i contains some school s * that t i prefers to any of her acceptable safe-if-favorite schools, including Q i (1). Thus, there will be some sub-profile Q * −i for which t i is assigned to s * when reporting Q i and to Q i (1) when reporting Q i and Q i cannot dominate Q i .
7 Comparing the manipulability of DA k and BOS k Many approaches allow to compare the manipulability of two mechanisms that both fail to be strategy-proof. 15 In this last section, we propose a new approach for manipulability comparisons and use our characterization of undominated strategies to apply this approach to DA k and BOS k (see Corollary 3). We also use our characterization of dominant strategies to apply the criterion developed by Arribillaga and Massó (2015) to DA k and BOS k .
Comparing uncontroversial recommendations
As discussed in the Introduction, advising students not to play dominated strategies is uncontroversial because this advice does not depend on any assumption about other students' strategies. Therefore, when it comes to comparing the manipulability of mechanisms, it seems natural to prefer a mechanism in which dominance excludes a larger set of strategies. Strictly speaking, the set of undominated strategies of DA k is not always included into the set of undominated strategies of BOS k . This is because, when the only undominated strategies are dominant strategies in DA k , by case (ii) in Proposition 1, these strategies may rank less than min{k, #R i } acceptable schools.
However, as discussed before, when a student has an undominated strategy that ranks less than min{k, #R i } acceptable schools, the student cannot lose from reporting a clean undominated strategy instead. If it is granted that playing a clean undominated strategies in DA k and an undominated strategy in BOS k are uncontroversial recommendations, then the set of strategies that can be ruled out by uncontroversial recommendations in DA k is a superset of that in BOS k .
Corollary 3. For all k ∈ N, t i ∈ T , R i , and Q i , if Q i is a clean undominated strategy in DA k , then Q i is also an undominated strategy in BOS k . The converse is not true if k ≥ 2. Arribillaga and Massó (2015) introduce another approach to comparing the manipulability of mechanisms. They argue that a mechanism is less manipulable the more it provides students with a truthful dominant strategy. Mechanism B is at least as manipulable as mechanism A (in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015) ) if for all t i , whenever t i has a truthful dominant strategy given R i in B, t i also has a truthful dominant strategy given R i in A. Formally, for every profile of priorities F and capacities q and for all t i ∈ T , {R i | t i has a truthfull dominant strategy in B} ⊆{R i | t i has a truthfull dominant strategy in A}.
Comparing dominant strategies
(1)
In the context of constrained school choice mechanisms M k , we consider that any strategy in which t i reports her min{k, #R i } most preferred schools without switches is a truthful strategy.
Mechanism B is more manipulable than mechanism A if B is at least as manipulable as B but the converse is not true. In the context of constrained school choice mechanisms, this means that there exists a profile of priorities F and a profile of capacities q such that ⊂ replaces ⊆ in (1). Mechanism B is equally manipulable as A if A is at least as manipulable as B and B is at least as manipulable as A, i.e., = replaces ⊆ in (1) (for all F and q).
The following result is a direct corollary of our characterization of dominant strategies in Propositions 1 and 3.
Corollary 4. For all k ≥ 2, BOS k is more manipulable than DA k .
16
Propositions 1 and 3 also enable the comparison of DA k and BOS k for different values of k.
Corollary 5. For all k ≤ m − 1, DA k+1 is less manipulable than DA k .
Corollary 6. For all k ∈ N, BOS k+1 is equally manipulable as BOS k . Figure 2 summarizes Corollaries 4 to 6. The corollaries in this section indicate that the advantage of DA over BOS in terms of manipulability carries over to DA k and BOS k .
Conclusion
Corollary 4 confirms Proposition 3 in Pathak and Sönmez (2013) which shows that DA k is less manipulable than BOS k using a different criterion based on
Figure 2: Manipulability comparisons of BOS k and DA k in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015), where A > B indicates that A is less manipulable than B and A = B indicates that A and B are equally manipulable. the nestedness of profiles that admit a truthful Nash equilibrium. Pathak and Sönmez (2013, Section 3) introduce yet another criterion based on the inclusion of profiles at which no player can manipulate. Although comparisons in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (2013, Section 3) imply comparisons in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015) , the converse is not true.
17 In particular, none of the results summarized in Figure 2 have any implication for comparisons in the sense of Pathak and Sönmez (2013, Section 3). Whether constrained school choice mechanisms can be compared using Pathak and Sönmez (2013, Section 3) and how these comparisons would play out is an open question.
A Additional notation
We introduce some additional notation and terminology we use in the Appendix.
For reported preferences Q i and preferences R i , we abuse the notation and write Q i = R i to refer to case (i) in Proposition 1, that is Q i = R i means that Q i is of the form Q i : R i (1) . . . R i (#R i ) t i . . . . For any two strategies Q i and Q i , we also write Q i = Q i if both strategies share the same set of ranked schools and report those schools in the same order. Similarly Q i = R i means that Q i is not of the form Q i : R i (1) . . . R i (#R i ) t i . . . . The higher priority of student t g over t h at school s j is denoted t g F j t h . Given a strategy Q i , the truncation of Q i after school s is another strategy Q i obtained from Q i be deleting all schools s ∈ Q i reported after s.
B Proofs for dominant and undominated strategies in DA k
B.1 Preliminary results

Lemma 1
Let Q i be any strategy of DA k which ranks exactly min{k, #R i } acceptable schools without switch, including all acceptable schools ranked in Q i . For any strategyQ i , let RQ i be any preference relation over S ∪ {t i } of the form
where Q S\Qi is any sub-orderings of the schools in S\Q i . Because DA is non-manipulable (Dubins and Freedman, 1981) , we have
In particular,
But because DA k is obtained from DA by considering only the profiles Q k with #Q k j ≤ k for all t j ∈ T , the last displayed relation implies
By construction, Q i is without switch, and therefore, the last displayed relation implies
Clearly, by definition of DA k ,
and (2) simplifies to
Now, because every acceptable school ranked in Q i is ranked in Q i , the only cases (if any) in which DA
and therefore, in these cases too,
Thus, (3) further simplifies to
Then, if in addition of (4)
Q i would weakly dominate Q i . But this would contradict the assumption that Q i is undominated in DA k . Therefore, we must in fact have
But because R is antisymmetric, (4) and (5) imply
the desired result.
Lemma 2
Let B be the set of schools that t i ranks aboveŝ in Q i . These are the schools t i applied to in the course of DA k under (Q i , Q −i ), but did not get assigned to. Because t i was rejected from the schools in B, it must be that, in the list of assignments DA k (Q i , Q −i ), there is another student assigned to each of the available seats in each of the schools in B. Let this set of students be A ⊂ T . Now construct Q * −i as follows : • For all t j ∈ A, let Q * j be the strategy in which t j ranks only DA k j (Q i , Q −i ).
• For all t h ∈ T \{A ∪ {t i }}, let Q * h be any strategy in which t h ranks neither s * norŝ.
By construction, for every school s j ∈ B, there are at least q j -students with higher priority at s j than t i who rank s first in Q * −i . Thus, t i will be rejected from any of these schools over the course of DA k given that the reported profile is (
By construction again, no students rankŝ in Q * −i . Therefore,
Because Q i is antisymmetric, the last two displayed relations imply
which proves (i).
Again, by construction, no-one applies to s * . Thus, for any Q * i with s * ∈ Q * i , we have
which proves (ii).
Lemma 3
The proof is by contradiction. Lemma 1 tells us that there exists a strategy Q i which ranks min{k, #R i } acceptable schools without switch including all the acceptable schools in Q i and which satisfies
We break the proof down in three cases which correspond to the three possible sources of uncleanness (the labeling of the sources of uncleanness matches the labeling in the text).
(ii) unacceptable schools are ranked in Q i . Let s be any unacceptable school ranked in Q i . By (6) and because only acceptable schools are ranked in Q i , s / ∈ Range(Q i ). But this implies s is ranked after a safe set, proving that Q i contains a safe set and that (2) holds.
(i) Q i contains switches. Take any schools s and s which are switched in Q i . Without loss of generality, let s Q i s and s P i s. In order to derive a contradiction, assume that either s or s are not ranked after a safe set in Q i (potentially because Q i does not contain a safe set).
Since s Q i s we have s ∈ Range(Q i ). By point (ii) this means that s is an acceptable school of Q i . Because s P i s, s is also an acceptable school ranked in Q i . Hence, by construction of Q i , both s and s are ranked in Q i .
By Lemma 2, there exists
(iii) Q i contains less than min{k, #R i } acceptable schools. Let s be any acceptable school ranked in Q i but not in Q i . In order to derive a contradiction, assume that Q i contains no safe set. The absence of safe set ranked in Q i implies that DA (i) The sufficiency of (i) follows directly from the fact that DA is nonmanipulable. (Dubins and Freedman, 1981) . See the beginning of the proof of Lemma 1 for an explanation of how this extends to DA k .
B.2 Characterizing dominant strategies
(ii) By construction, strategy Q i ranks the q most preferred schools in R i without switches. Following the same argument as in Lemma 1,
for all Q i and all Q −i such that
But by definition of a safe set and because Q i is without switches, if
holds for all Q i and all Q −i , and we are done.
Necessity.
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exists a dominant strategy Q i for which neither (i) nor (ii) hold.
Because Q i is a dominant strategy, Q i is also an undominated strategy. This means Lemma 3 applies, and there exists a clean strategy Q i which is equivalent to Q i , and is therefore also a dominant strategy.
Because Q i is without switches, without unacceptable schools, and min{k, #R i } schools are ranked in Q i , there is an acceptable school s * which is not ranked in Q i and which is such that s * P i w Q i . By construction of Q i and because Q i violates both (i) and (ii), w Q i is not ranked after any safe set in Q i and hence w Q i ∈ Range(Q i ). But then by Lemma 2, there is a subprofile Q * −i and a strategy without switch
Case 2: Q i = R i . Because Q i is without switch, Q i cannot be a safe strategy (otherwise (ii) would hold for Q i , by construction of Q i from Q i ). By Lemma 2 again, if there is an acceptable school s * / ∈ Q i , there is a subprofile Q * −i and a strategy
* , contradicting the fact that Q i is a dominant strategy. Therefore, all acceptable schools are ranked first in Q i without switch, and those are the only schools ranked in Q i . But because Q i is unsafe, Q i is unsafe too, which means no unacceptable school can be ranked in Q i . Thus, it is also the case that all acceptable schools are ranked first in Q i without switch, and that those are the only schools ranked in Q i , contradicting (i).
Corollary 1
It is easy to see that if for some Q −i , t i is assigned to an unacceptable school or prefers a school s with an available seat to her assignment, strategy Q i cannot be dominant. Respectively, ranking no acceptable school or ranking s as the only acceptable school dominates Q i given Q −i .
To see that t i is not involved in a blocking pair, take any school s j such that
. By Proposition 1, s j is an acceptable school and t i applied and was rejected from s j . At the round at which t i was rejected from s j , there are q j students t g = t i assigned to s j with higher priority at s j than t i . If any student t h is rejected from s j in a later round of DA k , the seat in s j previously occupied by t h is assigned to another student t with higher priority at s j than t h , and hence with higher priority at s j than t i . Therefore, there cannot be any student t h with t i F j t h such that DA k h (Q) = s j . This means t i cannot be in a blocking pair with s j .
B.3 Characterizing undominated strategies
Lemma 4 By Proposition 1, because Q i is not dominant, we have Q i = R i and the q most preferred schools of Q i do not form a safe set covering the q most preferred schools of R i for any q ≤ k. Thus, either (i) Q i contains a safe set but there is an acceptable school s ∈ R i with s / ∈ Q i such that s P i w Range(Qi) , or
We first show by contradiction that Q i is unclean. Assume to the contrary that Q i is clean. As #Q i < k, if Q i is clean, then #Q i = #R i . Thus, either Q i contains switches contradicting the definition of a clean strategy, or Q i contains no switches and Q i = R i , which contradicts the assumption that Q i is not dominant.
By Lemma 3, because Q i is an unclean undominated strategy, Q i contains a safe set S S , which rules out case (ii) and we need only consider case (i). By Lemma 3 again, the safe set S S contained in Q i is such that any schools (s, s ) that are switched in Q i are ranked after S S . Now, the strategy Q i that ranks all the schools in Range(Q i ) as well as s, without switch. Because #Q i < k, Q i is a well-defined strategy for DA k . By an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 1, DA k is strategy-proof for any agent with no more than k acceptable schools. Therefore,
But because Q i is without switch on Range(Q i ) ∪ {s} and on Range(Q i ), we have
Now because s / ∈ Q i , Lemma 2 applies and there exists Q * −i such that
which together with (8) implies that Q i dominates Q i , the desired result.
Proposition 2
Necessity.
Let Q i be any undominated strategy of DA k . We show that if Q i is not a dominant strategy in DA k , then (ii) holds. First, we show that #Range(Q i ) = k for any Q i that is undominated but not dominant in DA k .
Clearly we cannot have #Range(Q i ) > k as that would mean Q i is not a well-defined strategy in DA k . So in order to derive a contradiction, assume that #Range(Q i ) < k. This means that either (a) Q i contains a safe set with less than k schools, or (b) #Q i < k. But by Lemma 4 and the fact that Q i is undominated but not dominant, (b) yields a contradiction. Thus, (a) must hold. Now, consider the strategy Q i constructed from Q i by removing a ranked school ranked after the safe set. Strategy Q i is equivalent to Q i . Clearly, #Q i < k and because Q i is equivalent to Q i , Q i is also undominated but not dominant. Again, this contradicts Lemma 4 and hence #Range(Q i ) = k.
We now prove each of Q i 's properties described in (ii).
No switch. By Lemma 3, no switched schools are in Range(Q i ). Since #Range(Q i ) = k for any Q i that is undominated but not dominant in DA k , Q i contains no switches.
Q i ranks k acceptable schools By Lemma 3, if Q i contains any unacceptable school s, then s is not in Range(Q i ). Again, as #Range(Q i ) = k, this implies that s is ranked in Q i .
No minimal safe set "dominates" Q i We prove the contrapositive : if a minimal safe set "dominates" Q i in the sense that it satisfies the properties described in the statement of the proposition, then Q i is dominated. Let M M S be some minimal safe set of schools with #S M S ≤ k and S
M S
Q i such that for all s ∈ Q i with s / ∈ S M S , we have w
which consists in only ranking S M S without switch. Because
is a well-defined strategy in DA k . By an argument we have already used many times, because DA k is strategy-proof for every student who has no more than #S M S ≤ k acceptable schools, and because Q S M S is without switch
But because w S M S R i s for all s ∈ Q i with s / ∈ S M S , the last displayed relation generalizes to
Now because S
such that s * / ∈ Q i , and by Lemma 2, there exists Q * i such that
, and because R i is antisymmetric, the last relation in fact yields
Together, (9) and (10) show that Q
dominates Q i , the desired result.
Sufficiency.
Clearly, if Q i is a dominant strategy (case (i)), Q i is undominated. Thus, assume that Q i is not a dominant strategy but satisfies (ii). We need to prove that Q i is undominated. In order to derive a contradiction, assume that there exists a strategy that dominates Q i .
Because the "domination" relation is transitive, because there are a finite number of strategies and because some strategy dominates Q i , there exists an undominated strategy Q i that dominates Q i . Also, by Lemma 1, there exists a clean undominated strategy Q i that is equivalent to Q i . In particular, Q i dominates Q i too.
There are two cases.
Case 1: Q i is unsafe. Note that if Q i and Q i rank the same schools, because both Q i and Q i are without switch (by (ii) for Q i and by construction for Q i ), we have Q i = Q i and Q i cannot dominate Q i . Thus, suppose that Q i does not rank the same schools as Q i , i.e., there exists
If s * / ∈ Range(Q i ), then Q i is safe. But a safe strategy Q i ranking only acceptable schools cannot be dominated by an unsafe strategy Q i . Thus, suppose that s
contradicting the assumption that Q i dominates Q i .
Case 2: Q i is safe.
As Q i contains a safe set, Range(Q i ) is a safe set. In fact, Range(Q i ) is a minimal safe set. Indeed, because Q i is without switch, if Range(Q i )\w (1) : (a) holds and Q i is a dominant strategy. Then by Proposition 1, Q i is dominant too since Q i is without switches. This contradicts the assumption that Q i dominates Q i . Subcase (a)(2) : (a) holds and Q i is not dominant. 
C Dominant and undominated strategies in BOS k
C.1 Preliminary results
Lemma 5
In order to derive a contradiction, assume that s ∈ Range(Q i ) and s is unacceptable. We construct Q i dominating Q i in BOS k , contradicting the assumption that Q i is an undominated strategy. The construction of Q i is step by step:
• Last step * is the minimal step such that either * = #Range(Q i ) or all acceptable schools are ranked in Q i .
We now prove that Q i dominates Q i in BOS k . First, we show by contradiction that for all Q −i , we have
Assume that there exists Q * −i such that
This implies that s Q is acceptable as, by construction, Q i contains no unacceptable schools.
Let r Q be the round of BOS k at which t i is assigned to s Q in BOS at a weakly lower rank in Q i than in Q i , which implies that r
Q , the set of t j = t i who apply to s Q before round r Q , together with the set of t j = t i who apply to s Q in round r Q and have higher priority than t i at s Q , has less than q s Q students. But then, the set of t j = t i who apply to s Q before round r s Q Q < r Q , together with the set of t j = t i who apply to s Q in round r s Q Q and have higher priority than t i at s Q also has less than q s Q students. Therefore, t i is assigned a school at a round r ≤ r 
Now, by construction of Q i , for all ranks h ∈ {1, . . . , r }, the school Q i (h) satisfies
and is such that either
In the construction, (ii) corresponds to the cases in which either Q i (h) / ∈ R i , or Q i (h) ∈ R i but Q i (h) = Q i (h) for some h < h. In these cases, the construction prescribes to set Q i (h) to the most preferred school according to R i which is not yet ranked in Q i (h), for some h < h. Because we only look at h such that (13) holds, s Q has not yet been ranked, and hence, (ii) must hold. Now, let us compare the effect of ranking Q i with the effect of ranking Q i round by round in BOS k , for rounds r ≤ r s Q Q (when the students t j = t i rank Q * −i ). Because r ≤ r s Q Q ≤ r Q , t i is rejected from the school she applies to in every round r < r when ranking Q i . Thus at each round r < r , either 1. (i) holds and t i is also rejected at round r when ranking Q i , 18 or
(i) does not hold and (ii) holds, that is
Then either
But given (14), 2.(b) clearly contradicts (12). Thus t i must be rejected at every round r < r s Q Q of BOS k when ranking Q i . Now, this implies that BOS k will move on to round r , implying r = r . But by (13), this means
again contradicting (12). Hence, (11) must hold.
In order to prove that the constructed Q i dominates Q i , there remains to show that there exists Q * * −i such that
By the definition of Range(Q i ), for every school s ∈ Range(Q i ), there exists Q s −i such that
This is also true for any unacceptable school s ∈ Range(Q i ). By assumption, there exists an unacceptable s ∈ Range(Q i ). Since Q i contains only acceptable schools, we have that either
In both cases we have BOS 
Lemma 6
As the proof of sufficiency is obvious, we only prove necessity. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that neither (i) nor (ii) are true. Consider any subprofile Q * −i constructed as follows
• Take any set of q Qi(1) students t j = t i among the students with higher priority at Q i (1) than t i , and let
• For any ∈ {2, . . . , #Q i } take q Qi( ) students t k whose reported preferences have not been constrained yet and let
Because (i) is false, there are at least q Qi(1) students in T with higher priority at school Q i (1) than t i . Because (ii) is false, any oversupplied set of schools contains more than k schools. Therefore, {Q i (1), . . . , Q i (#Q i )} is not an oversupplied set of schools. Hence, there are enough students to construct the sub-profile Q −i described above and Q * −i is well-defined. Because Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite for t i we have BOS 
Lemma 7
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that Q i dominates Q i and that Q i is unsafe. If Q i is safe, it is obvious that the unsafe strategy Q i does not dominate the safe Q i given that Q i contains only acceptable schools. Therefore, we focus on the case in which Q i is unsafe too.
We show that Q i does not dominate Q i . Again, this is trivially true if Q i = Q i and we therefore focus on the case Q i = Q i .
Let r be the lowest rank for which Q i (r) = Q i (r). There are two cases.
This case implies that strategy Q i is the truncation of Q i after rank #Q i . Therefore, we have #Q i = #R i < k. As a consequence, Q i (r) is unacceptable because all acceptable schools are ranked in Q i before rank r. Because Q i is unsafe, there exists Q *
; that is, t i is assigned to an unacceptable school.
19 As all schools ranked in Q i are acceptable, t i strictly prefers her assignment when ranking Q i and other students rank Q * −i . This shows that strategy Q i does not dominate Q i .
Case 2: r ≤ #Q i .
We construct Q * −i such that
that is t i is assigned to an acceptable school when playing Q i and unassigned when playing Q i . We consider two constructions for two different cases.
• Take the q Qi(1) students t j = t i with the highest priority at school Q i (1) and let Q * j : Q i (1), • For all s ∈ Q i with s = Q i (1) and s = Q i (r), take q s students t u whose reported preferences are not yet constrained and let Q * u : s, • Take q Q i (r) − 1 students t v whose reported preferences are not yet constrained and let Q * v : Q i (r), • Take a student t g whose reported preferences are not yet constrained. If
g is the truncation of Q i after school Q i (r), else it is the truncation of Q i after school Q i (r) with in addition Q g (r + 1) * := Q i (r).
• Students whose preference is not specified yet do not rank school Q i (r).
We show that Q * −i is well-defined. First, Q i is unsafe and hence, Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite. As a result, there are enough students t j in T for the first step of the construction. Second, there are enough students to construct Q * −i because the number of students whose preference is constrained (including student t i ) is equal to the sum of the seats available at the schools ranked in the unsafe Q i .
20 As Q i is unsafe, the sum of the seats available at these schools is no greater than n by Lemma 6. Therefore, Q * i can be constructed. By construction, BOS k i (Q i , Q * −i ) = t i as all the seats at all the schools ranked in Q i are allocated at round 1 of the algorithm to other students than t i , except for one seat at school Q i (r) if r = 1. This last seat is allocated to t i at round r for strategy Q i and is allocated to t g at round r or r + 1 for strategy Q i .
Construction 2 :
The construction of Q * −i is almost identical. The only difference is that no student t v is constrained to rank Q * v : Q i (r) and that t g 's preferences are not constrained.
C.2 Characterizing dominant strategies
Proposition 3
The sufficiency of the two conditions is obvious.
19 This is proven formally in Lemma 8, see below. The construction of Q * −i follows a procedure similar to the one introduced in the proof of Lemma 6. 20 Recall that Q i (r) ∈ Q i .
For the case in which #R i = 1 and R i (1) is not safe-if-favorite, the necessity of condition (ii) is a corollary of the fact that a single class of strategies Q i = R i qualify as undominated strategies, as proven in Proposition 4 (see below).
To complete the proof, let us show that condition (i) is necessary when #R i ≥ 2. We consider two cases.
By Proposition 4, such Q i is not an undominated strategy in BOS k . Hence, Q i is not a dominant strategy either.
Case 2: R i (1) is not safe-if-favorite.
We prove that there exists no dominant strategies by showing the existence of Q i and Q i such that
• Q i and Q i are undominated strategy in BOS k and
• Q i and Q i are not equivalent strategies.
Let Q i be such that Q i (1) := R i (1) and Q i contains min{k, #R i } acceptable schools. Strategy Q i is an undominated strategy by Proposition 4. Let Q i be such that Q i (1) := R i (2) and Q i contains min{k, #R i } acceptable schools. Strategy Q i is an undominated strategy by Proposition 4 because #R i ≥ 2 and R i (1) is not safe-if-favorite. Observe that this is true whether or not R i (2) is safe-if-favorite.
There exists Q * −i -for example Q * j contains no school for all t j = t i -for which Q i and Q i yield different assignments and they are hence not equivalent.
Corollary 2
We first show that t i is not part of a blocking pair. By Proposition 3, if Q i is a dominant strategy, then two cases can arise:
This case is such that BOS k i (Q) = R i (1). Hence, there exists no s with s P i BOS k i (Q) and t i cannot be part of a blocking pair.
Case 2: #R i = 1 and
, then t i cannot participate to a blocking pair for the reason explained in Case 1. If on the other hand BOS k i (Q) = t i , then student t i was rejected from R i (1) in the first round of BOS k for profile Q. This implies that q Ri(1) students with higher priority than t i at R i (1) are assigned to R i (1) after the first round of the algorithm. The same students are assigned to R i (1) at the end of the algorithm. Therefore t i cannot participate in a blocking pair as she only finds R i (1) acceptable.
It is easy to see that if t i is assigned to a unacceptable school or prefers a school s with an available seat to her assignment, strategy Q i cannot be dominant. Respectively, ranking no acceptable school and ranking s as the only acceptable school dominates Q i .
C.3 Characterizing undominated strategies
Proposition 4 Sufficiency.
Case (i)
If Q i (1) is the favorite acceptable safe-if-favorite, then Q i is a safe strategy by Lemma 6. By the definition of an unsafe strategy, only a safe strategy Q i can dominate the safe Q i that guarantees assignment in the acceptable school Q i (1). By Lemma 6, Q i is safe if and only if Q i (1) is safe-if-favorite (given the short-supply assumption). As Q i (1) is the favorite acceptable safe-if-favorite, any strategy Q i that dominates Q i must be such that Q i (1) = Q i (1). As Q i (1) is safe-if-favorite, the two strategies lead to the same assignment for t i whatever the strategies reported by other students, Hence Q i and Q i are equivalent and Q i cannot dominate Q i .
Case (ii)
If Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite, then Q i is unsafe by Lemma 6. By Lemma 7, if Q i is dominated, then Q i is dominated by a safe strategy Q i . Again, the safe strategy Q i must be such that Q i (1) is safe-if-favorite (Lemma 6). Now, by assumption, there exists a school s ∈ Q i that is preferred to the favorite acceptable safe-if-favorite. This guarantees that Q i does not dominate Q i . Indeed, Lemma 8 (see below) shows that for any school s ranked in an unsafe strategy, there exists Q * −i such that As Q i (1) is safe-if-favorite we have BOS k i (Q i , Q * * −i ) = Q i (1). By assumption we also have s P i Q i (1), which shows that strategy Q i does not dominate Q i .
Necessity.
Case (i)
If Q i (1) is safe-if-favorite but not the favorite acceptable safe-if-favorite, it is clearly dominated by Q i for which Q i (1) is the favorite acceptable safe-iffavorite.
Case (ii)
Now, suppose Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite. Assume first that Q i contains no school preferred to the favorite safe-if-favorite. Then it is again dominated by any Q i for which Q i (1) is the favorite safe-if-favorite. Assume now that Q i contains less than min{k, #R i } acceptable schools. Two cases can arise:
• Q i contains unacceptable schools.
As Q i (1) is not safe-if-favorite, all schools in Q i belong to Range(Q i ). By Lemma 5, Q i cannot be undominated strategy.
• Q i contains no unacceptable schools but less than min{k, #R i } acceptable schools.
In this case, there exists an acceptable school s that is not ranked in Q i . Strategy Q i : Q i s obtained by attaching s at the end of Q i can be played in BOS k and dominates Q i . By construction of Q i we have that if and, for simplicity, students t h who are unassigned in BOS k (Q i , Q * −i ) rank no schools at all in Q * * h .
21 Clearly, we still have
because the same set of students apply to Q i (1) in the first round (which implies that t i is still rejected from Q i (1) in the first round) and all the seats at all schools are filled in the first round. Now construct Q −i from Q * * −i by changing only the reported profile of students t j = t i who rank Q i ( ), and make those students rank no schools at all. Then if = 1, BOS k i (Q i , Q 1 −i ) = Q i (1), as requested. Also, if > 1, t i is still rejected from Q i (1) in the first round and all seats at all schools ranked before Q i ( ) in Q i are filled in the first round. Therefore, we clearly have BOS Clearly, if R i (1) is safe-if-favorite, strategies Q i with Q i (1) = R i (1) are the only undominated strategies in both BOS k and DA k . Thus we only need to prove the corollary for the case in which R i (1) is not safe-if-favorite.
By Proposition 2, there are two subcases.
Case (ii) : for some q ≤ min{k, #R i }, the q most preferred schools in R i form a safe set. Then, we have that q ≤ min{k + 1, #R i } and the q most preferred schools in R i form a safe set in DA k+1 . Therefore, t i has a dominant strategy in DA k+1 .
Part 2. For all k < m, there exist R i , F and q such that t i has a truthful dominant strategy in DA k+1 but not in DA k .
By Lemma 9 and 10, it is sufficient to show that if there exist R i , F and q such that t i has a dominant strategy in DA k+1 but not in DA k .
Take for example any preference R i featuring k + 1 acceptable schools such that R i contains no safe set. Such preferences always exist by the short-supply assumption. Any strategy Q i = R i is dominant in DA k+1 by Proposition 1(i). Strategy Q i is not well-defined in DA k since #Q i > 1. Furthermore, no strategy Q i is dominant in Q i as #R i > k (in violation of condition (i) in Proposition 1) and R i contains no safe set (in violation of condition (ii) in Proposition 1).
Corollary 6
For each R i at which t i has a truthful dominant strategy in BOS k , t i has a truthful dominant strategy in BOS q for all k, q ≥ 1. By Lemma 9 and 10, it is sufficient to prove that for each R i at which t i has a dominant strategy in BOS k , t i has a dominant strategy in BOS q for all k, q ≥ 1.
By Proposition 3, there are two cases for which t i has a dominant strategy in BOS k . The first case arises when R i (1) is safe-if-favorite. This implies that t i has a dominant strategy in BOS q . The second case arises when #R i = 1. Therefore, t i has a dominant strategy in BOS q .
